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Hybrid systems, and related formalisms, have been successfully used to model Cyber-Physical Systems. However, mathematical models are always a simplification of the system they are meant to describe, and one must be aware of this mismatch, when using these models to analyze a system. In safety analysis it is acceptable to use over-approximations of the system behavior, indeed they are the bread and butter of counterexample guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR). We propose a notion of system behavior robust wrt arbitrary small over-approximations, and argue that it is particularly appropriate for safety analysis.