You are required to read and agree to the below before accessing a full-text version of an article in the IDE article repository.

The full-text document you are about to access is subject to national and international copyright laws. In most cases (but not necessarily all) the consequence is that personal use is allowed given that the copyright owner is duly acknowledged and respected. All other use (typically) require an explicit permission (often in writing) by the copyright owner.

For the reports in this repository we specifically note that

  • the use of articles under IEEE copyright is governed by the IEEE copyright policy (available at http://www.ieee.org/web/publications/rights/copyrightpolicy.html)
  • the use of articles under ACM copyright is governed by the ACM copyright policy (available at http://www.acm.org/pubs/copyright_policy/)
  • technical reports and other articles issued by M‰lardalen University is free for personal use. For other use, the explicit consent of the authors is required
  • in other cases, please contact the copyright owner for detailed information

By accepting I agree to acknowledge and respect the rights of the copyright owner of the document I am about to access.

If you are in doubt, feel free to contact webmaster@ide.mdh.se

Deriving Safety Contracts to Support Architecture Design of Safety Critical Systems

Fulltext:


Publication Type:

Conference/Workshop Paper

Venue:

16th IEEE International Symposium on High Assurance Systems Engineering

Publisher:

IEEE

DOI:

DOI 10.1109/HASE.2015.27


Abstract

The use of contracts to enhance the maintainability of safety-critical systems has received a significant amount of research effort in recent years. However some key issues have been identified: the difficulty in dealing with the wide range of properties of systems and deriving contracts to capture those properties; and the challenge of dealing with the inevitable incompleteness of the contracts. In this paper, we explore how the derivation of contracts can be performed based on the results of failure analysis. We use the concept of safety kernels to alleviate the issues. Firstly the safety kernel means that the properties of the system that we may wish to manage can be dealt with at a more abstract level, reducing the challenges of representation and completeness of the “safety” contracts. Secondly the set of safety contracts is reduced so it is possible to reason about their satisfaction in a more rigorous manner.

Bibtex

@inproceedings{Sljivo3763,
author = {Irfan Sljivo and Omar Jaradat and Iain Bate and Patrick Graydon},
title = {Deriving Safety Contracts to Support Architecture Design of Safety Critical Systems},
isbn = {978-1-4799-8111-3},
pages = {126--133},
month = {January},
year = {2015},
booktitle = {16th IEEE International Symposium on High Assurance Systems Engineering},
publisher = {IEEE},
url = {http://www.es.mdh.se/publications/3763-}
}